Alperovitz makes it very clear that the main character Truman listened to while ignoring all this civilian and military advice was James Byrnes, the man who practically controlled Truman at the beginning of his tenure. Byrnes was one of the most experienced politicians in Washington after serving for more than thirty years in the House of Representatives and the Senate. He was also a justice to the U.S. Supreme Court, and at the request of President Roosevelt, he resigned from that post and accepted the role in the Roosevelt administration in the management of the domestic economy. Byrnes went to the Yalta conference with Roosevelt, and then was given the responsibility of getting Congress and the American people to accept the agreements reached at Yalta. James Conant concluded that an important person in the administration should be made public to show that the dropping of the bombs was a military necessity, thus saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, so he turned to Harvey Bundy and his son McGeorge Bundy. They agreed that the most important person to create this myth was Minister of War Henry Stimson. It was decided that Stimson would write a lengthy article to be published in a leading national magazine. This article was reviewed several times by McGeorge Bundy and Conant before being published in Harper`s Magazine in February 1947. The lengthy article was the subject of a front-page article and editorial in the New York Times, and the editorial said, “There is no doubt that the President and Mr. Stimson are right to mention that the bomb led the Japanese to surrender.” Later, in 1959, President Truman expressly supported this conclusion, including the idea that it saved the lives of one million American soldiers. This myth has since been repeated every year by the news media and various political leaders. But a strong agreement between the two main players in the Cold War, which limit nuclear weapons stockpiles, has proved very difficult to find.
President Eisenhower had insisted in 1955 to reach an agreement on the “open sky”. This would allow both sides to fly over each other`s military bases. This would ensure that both sides are complying with a future arms control agreement. The Soviets immediately rejected the idea. They did not own the aircraft to fly over American bases, and they saw it as an American attempt to legitimize espionage. For the Americans, the rigorous scrutiny of Soviet respect has remained fundamental to any agreement. This is a fundamental problem. Both sides were convinced of their own moral superiority. It was the other side that could not be trusted, and they reacted with astonishing indignation when their own good intentions were questioned. was perhaps the greatest political mistake of the war…. Unconditional capitulation was an open invitation to unconditional resistance; it discouraged resistance against Hitler, probably prolonged the war, cost us our lives and contributed to the rupture of the present peace.
The best book that I think should dispel this myth is the decision to use Gar Alperovitz`s bomb, because it explains not only the real reasons why the bombs were dropped, but also a detailed story about how and why the myth that this massacre of innocent civilians was justified and therefore morally acceptable. The main problem began with President Franklin Roosevelt`s policy of unconditional surrender, reluctantly adopted by Churchill and Stalin, which President Truman decided to adopt in April 1945 to succeed Roosevelt. Hanson Baldwin was the lead author of the New York Times, which covered World War II, and immediately after the war he wrote an important book entitled Great Mistakes of the War.