President Marcos, however, found ways to encourage the MNLF to sign an agreement full of provisions that were unclear as to future implementation, such as mantra phrases such as “discuss later,” “fix later” or “determine later.” Eleven of the nineteen provisions of the agreement ended either with “discussing later” or “to be fixed or to be fixed at a later date.” Among the mediators of the agreement were members of the four-page ministerial committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, headed by Ali Abdussalam Treki, representing Muammar Gaddafi, head of the host country, and the secretary general of the OIC, Amadou Karim Gaye. [4] Other members of the Quadrangle Ministerial Committee included, in addition to Treki, representatives from Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia. [1] After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, some of the founding members of the MNLF, such as Ustadz Salamat Hashim, decided to create their own group. Ustadz Hashim, part of the MNLF delegation that was present in Tripoli in December 1976, led the MILF from its founding years until its death in 2001. During the negotiations, Marcos noted in his diary that Misuari and Libyan diplomat Ali Treki have repeatedly insisted that “all Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan be organized in the same region. But they are prepared to put that to a referendum. [8] Marcos was inclined to accept, as he felt that “Palawan, the three Davaos, the two Surigaos, the two Agusans, Southern Cotabato, Bukidnon, the two Misamis, possibly Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte and others[8] did not want to be admitted to the autonomous region of Muslims. The day before the agreement was signed, negotiations were stalled and Gaddafi asked Imelda Marcos to return to Libya to speed up the talks. Imelda succeeded by telephone in persuading the Libyan head of state to accept the Philippine president`s proposal to “submit the issue of autonomy to the Philippine constitutional process”[9] for the thirteen provinces. The agreement was signed the next day. Since signing an agreement with the MNLF, at the request of a world power like the OIC, was not a small concession for Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the agreement was seen as a Pyrrhic victory for the MNLF and a breakthrough for peace. But it has given only false hope to the peace electoral districts in the Philippines and has not kept its promise.

The Tripoli agreement, which not only provided for the first autonomous region of Mindanao, symbolized the highly indeterminate, permanent and circular nature of the Mindanao peace process. The agreement also marked the beginning of the internationalization of internal conflict resolution in the Philippines, an abandonment of the so-called ASEAN (Association of South Asian Nations) convention on non-interference in the internal conflicts of member states. The new strategy included the facilitation and mediation of international bodies such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the good offices of a foreign government, the Libyan government. Ferdinand Marcos then implemented the agreement by creating two autonomous regions (instead of one) of ten provinces (instead of thirteen). This led to the collapse of the peace pact and the resumption of hostilities between the MNLF and Philippine government forces. [10] [11] But this time, the dynamics are different. In previous attempts to conclude an executive peace agreement in 1989 and 2001 with implementing laws, discontent with the proposed laws was such that the MNLF and MILF abstained and the overall participation rate was low. This time, the President, Chiefs of Staff, congressional and Senate leaders, the current GOVERNOR of ARMM and MILF leadership and a majority of MNLF leaders have publicly accepted the BOL as the best response to these historic problems.